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We describe two simple results in the theory of Cournot equilibria. The first has to do with the effect of taxation in a Cournot 
industry and the second describes under what conditions a Court-tot equilibrium will implicitly maximize an objective function. 
These results are probably known, but are not Al known, and they seem useful enough to be worth spelling out. 
1. Taxation in a Cournot industry 
Let y, be the output of firm i, c, its constant marginal cost, Y industry output, and P(Y) the 
industry price. Then the first-order conditions for a Cournot-Nash equilibrium can be written as 
P(Y)+P’(Y)y,-c,=o. (1) 
Summing these equations across the n firms we have 
nP(Y)+P’(Y)Y= i c,. (2) 
I=1 
Making the weak assumption that the left-hand side of this equation is downward sloping, there will 
be a unique Y that solves this equation, which depends only on the sum of the marginal costs, not on 
their distribution across the firms. The observation that output and price in a Cournot industry is 
independent of the distribution of marginal costs has undoubtably been noted and used several times 
in the literature. See for example, Dixit and Stern (1982) Katz (1984) Loury (1983) or Bergstrom and 
Varian (n.d.). 
Note that the same independence result holds in any conjectural variations model, as long as all 
firms have the same conjectural variation and we consider only interior equilibria. The latter 
condition becomes increasingly important as the market equilibrium approaches a competitive 
structure, since in that case only the low cost producer will produce a positive amount. 
Here we consider an application of this result to a taxation problem. Suppose that each of the n 
firms in the industry faces a quantity tax t,. Then this tax is just the same as a marginal cost, so we 
can apply the above result to show that the equilibrium output and price is independent of the 
distribution of taxes across the firms. Furthermore, if we make a tax change (At,) that preserves the 
sum of the taxes, we must satisfy the first-order condition 
P(Y)+P’(Y)(y,+Ay,)=c,+t,+At,, 
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which implies that 
dy, = -dt,/P’( Y). (3) 
Thus we have an exact expression for the impact of a tax change on the equilibrium output of each 
firm. 
It is of interest to consider how tax revenue is affected by this sort of operation. It is most 
convenient to analyze this in the case of identical costs. Making this assumption, we take eq. (1). 
multiply through by .F,, and sum to get 
P(r)Y-cY+P’(Y)i.y,2= -jy t,_v,. (4) 
/=1 ,=I 
The first two terms on the left-hand side are industry profits. which we denote by II. The term on the 
right-hand side is total tax revenue. Using the standard variance identity, we can rewrite this equation 
as 
R = II + P’( Y)[ na,’ + Y”/,n’]. 
where (T,’ is the variance of output across firms. Using (1). we can solve for y,, 
): =~+f,-W) 
. I P'(Y) ’ 





As we change the distribution of taxes across firms, the industry price, output and profits remain 
constant but tax revenue will change. The above formula shows that tax revenue is a decreusing 
function of the variance of the taxes across the firms in the industry. This shows for example that tax 
revenue is maximized when all firms face the same tax rates, as economic intuition would suggest. 
2. What does a Cournot equilibrium maximize? 
This question was first raised and answered by Spence (1976) in the context of his monopolistic 
competition model. It was later examined by Loury (1983) in a model of intertemporal Cournot 
equilibria. As far as we know this question has not been addressed for the standard Cournot model. 
although it may well be part of the folklore. 
Let us first consider the case of identical cost functions. In what follows we will assume that 
P’(Y) < 0, P”(Y) < 0, and c”(y) > 0, although weaker assumptions will work for some of the results. 
In this case a symmetric Cournot equilibrium satisfies the first- and second-order conditions: 
P(Y)+P’(Y)y-c’(y)=O, 2P’(Y) + P”( Y)y - c”(Y) < 0, (8),(9) 
where y = Y/n. Under our assumptions the second-order condition is satisfied so there is at most one 
symmetric Cournot equilibrium. 
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Now consider the function 
F(Y)=(n-l)[U(Y)-nc(Y/n)] +P(Y)Y-nc(Y/n) where U(Y) =l’P(t)dt. 
That is, U(Y) is just the area beneath the market demand curve - also known as consumers’ surplus. 
Then a local maximum of F(Y) is characterized by the first- and second-order conditions. 
(n-l)[P(Y)-c’(Y/n)] +P(Y)+P’(Y)Y-c’(Y/n)=O, (10) 
(n+l)P’(Y)+P”(Y)Y-c”(Y/n)<O. 
Again our assumptions imply that there will 
by inspection, eqs. (8) and (10) are the 
equilibrium maximizes the function F( Y ). 
(11) 
be a unique maximum that satisfies these conditions. But 
same - the industry output in a symmetric Cournot 
It is not necessary to give the U(Y) term a welfare interpretation in this context; all that matters is 
that its derivative is the inverse demand curve. However, the welfare interpretation is suggestive. The 
first term is simply the net consumers’ surplus ~ what society should be maximizing ~ and the second 
term is profits. If there is only one firm in the market - a monopoly - industry output is determined 
entirely by profit maximization. As the number of firms increases, more and more weight is given to 
the welfare term as compared to the profit term, and as n approaches infinity, industry structure 
approaches pure competition and thus the socially optimal level of output. 
How far can we generalize this result ? One interesting direction of extension would be to 
non-symmetric equilibria. Suppose there were some function f(v,, . . . . I;,) such that the singular 
points of this function were the first-order conditions that characterize a Nash equilibrium, i.e., 
af(Y 13 ’ . 3 A:,, > 
ay, =P(Y)+P’(Y)y,-cc:(y,)=O. 
Then applying the standard integrability conditions, we would have to have 
a*f 
-=P’(Y)+P”(Y)y,=P’(Y)+P”(Y));=&. 
h, a.4 I 1 
It follows that we must have y, = y, = Y/n. This observation implies that we must restrict ourselves to 
symmetric equilibria. 
However we can relax the assumption of zero conjectural variation. If we restrict ourselves to 
symmetric equilibria and let dY/dy = 1 + y be the conjectural variation, then it is straightforward to 
show that industry output maximizes the following expression: 
(n-l)[U(Y)-nc(Y/n)] +P(Y)Y-nc(Y/n)+y[P(Y)Y- U(Y)]. 
This interpretation of this expression is similar to that given above, but not as natural, at least to us. 
References 
Bergstrom, T. and H. Varian. n.d., When are Nash equilibria independent of the distribution of agents’ characteristics. Review 
of Economic Studies, forthcoming. 
Dixit. A. and N. Stern. 1982. Olvgopoly and welfare: A unified presentation and appltcation to trade and development. 
European Economx Review 19. 123-143. 
Loury, G.. 1983. A theory of ‘oil’igopoly: Cournot equilibrium in exhaustible resource markets Hith fixed aupplie.\. Harvard 
University working paper no. 978 (Harvard University. Cambridge. MA). Forthcoming In International Economic Revieu. 
Katr. M.. 1984. An analysis of cooperative research and development. Princeton University Norking paper 76 (Princeton 
University. Princeton. NJ). 
Spence, M.. 1976. Product selection. fixed costs. and monopolistic competition. Revle\v of Economic Studies 43. 217-235. 
